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Abstract
This article analyzes the business ethics of digital games, using Ayn Rand’s philosophy of Objectivism. It identifies different 
types of monetization options as virtuous or nonvirtuous, based on Rand’s views on rational self-interest. It divides the options 
into ethical Mover and unethical Looter designs, presents those logics in relation to an illustrative case example, Zynga, and 
then discusses a view on the role of players in relation to game monetization designs. Through our analysis of monetization 
options in the context of Objectivist ethics, the article contributes to discussions on game revenue ethics. It also expands the 
still understudied area of applying Rand’s ethics to business, in the context of a new sector, game development, and business. 
This research enables ethicists to apply a wider-than-before perspective on virtue ethics to online business, and helps game 
developers act in a virtuous manner, which provides them with a long-term business advantage.
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Introduction
In this article, we continue the trend of analyzing the design 
and business logic of digital games, especially free-to-play 
(F2P) games, by means of one major ethics theory at a 
time (e.g., Heimo et al. 2018). With it, we seek to provide 
our readers with reasons and guidelines for ethical action, 
which is important for long-term efficiency, customer value, 
and even personal endurance in the highly competitive and 
stressful business of game design (O’Donnell 2014; see also 
Keinonen 2017). F2P is a revenue model where games1 are 
distributed and played free-of-charge, while players are mon-
etized, in particular, via real-money transactions (RMTs) and 
in-app purchases (IAPs) during game play. In such games, 
people pay money for such things as extra content, competi-
tive advantages, or to skip boring parts of a play experience 
(Harviainen et al. 2018).
Recent works have explored the monetization ethics of 
digital games from the point of view of Moor’s ethics of just 
consequences (Kimppa et al. 2015; building upon Moor 1999), 
and Aristotelian virtue ethics (Heimo et al. 2018). This arti-
cle takes a slightly more radical path; Ayn Rand (1905–1982) 
is controversial as a philosopher and ethicist (e.g., Gladsteim 
1999, ch. 5; Salmieri 2016). Nevertheless, the influence of 
her philosophy of Objectivism and its ethics (also known as 
rational egoism, a phrase which we will be using as a synonym 
for Objectivism throughout this article) on current-day con-
servative and libertarian thinking, particularly in the United 
States, is hard to deny (e.g., Allison 2013; Brook and Wat-
kins 2012). Objectivism is, therefore, an increasingly impor-
tant subject of serious study within both business ethics and 
national economics research. Several cases of academic appli-
cations of Rand’s Objectivism to business ethics already exist 
(e.g., Drake 2016; Locke and Woiceshyn 1995; Simpson 2005, 
2009; Woiceshyn 2011, 2012). Here, we apply the approach 
and insights provided by such works into a new arena: the 
contemporary topic of games as business phenomena.
This article examines videogame monetization in the 
context of Rand’s ethics of Objectivism (further described 
below). We show that even when selfishness is considered a 
virtue, many shades of grey exist. Some forms of applying 
rational egoism are far more virtuous than others. Many of 
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1 For the sake of readability, we often use the word “games” to 
denote digital games in general. “Social games,” in turn, is in this 
article used to mean digital games played on social network services 
such as Facebook. Some of them, but not all of such games, are also 
F2P games.
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the possible variations relate to differences between mon-
etization types and design decisions. Analyzing those, we 
answer the research question: Which types of F2P moneti-
zation would Rand’s Objectivism consider virtuous, and 
what does that mean for game developers and players?
We show that various levels of virtuousness exist within 
monetization, and suggest ways for designers to be more vir-
tuous, providing a long-term business advantage (Woiceshyn 
2011). We add to the ongoing discussions on the ethics of 
software sales and online business ethics (e.g., Koehn 2003; 
Kracher and Corritore 2004; Laczniak and Murphy 2006), 
business egoism (e.g., Ramanathan and Swain 2017), and 
the ways in which digitalization affects consumer identity 
(Belk 2013). We accomplish this by identifying new view-
points based on rational egoism, and thereby provide new 
knowledge on rational business behavior and the advantages 
it brings to game developers.2
Studies on the business ethics of game monetization are 
still rare. Most of the few studies that have been made since 
the beginning of the F2P era (Davidovici-Nora 2014) have 
discussed only challenges, not solutions. Examples of top-
ics include: monetization design (e.g., Jordan et al. 2016; 
Harviainen et al. 2018); pseudo-randomized, gambling-like 
“gacha” (or “loot box”) content sales mechanics, (Koeder 
et al. 2018); the selling of player information to third par-
ties and the luring of existing players to virally recruit more 
players (together called “player commodification” by ear-
lier researchers; e.g., Nieborg 2015, 2017); and workforce 
exploitation in game production (O’Donnell 2014). The two 
works on applying the ethics of Aristotle (Heimo et al. 2018) 
and Moor (Kimppa et al. 2015) on game monetization are 
the key exception, and form the research basis upon which 
this article builds its monetization typologies.
As its inspiration, this article takes Heimo et al.’s (2018) 
observation that some F2P game developers may not want 
to be virtuous. Instead, they may just want to make as much 
money as possible. The second starting point is Alha et al.’s 
(Alha et al. 2014) finding that not all developers agree on 
what can be considered ethical in the context of monetiza-
tion. We expand from these two angles, to study what hap-
pens if monetization is considered a positive thing. However, 
we argue here that it is positive only when it is accomplished 
virtuously.3
From what is stereotypically and inaccurately thought 
of as a Randian perspective, all money-seeking activities is 
supposedly considered virtuous, including cases of exploi-
tation. This is a false, if persistent and popular, interpre-
tation of Rand. Greed, in the sense in which it is defined 
by rational egoism, is never good. Rational self-interest is 
virtuous behavior that helps one prosper. Greed is the unethi-
cal, irrational pursuit of things to which one does not have 
any right. (Smith 2006, pp. 217–220; Woiceshyn 2012, pp. 
111–113). The pursuit of wealth, as an expression of produc-
tiveness, is ethical. Dishonest means of acquiring or hoard-
ing wealth are not. The everyday use of the word “greed” 
confuses these two concepts, which is why it should not be 
used at all (Woiceshyn 2012, p. 113).
In Objectivism, the purpose of ethics is to help humans 
survive and to flourish (Peikoff 1991; Rand 1964). Greed, as 
defined in Objectivism, does not accomplish that purpose, 
at least not in the long run (Woiceshyn 2012). Rand her-
self would likely consider every dishonest game developer 
to be a stealing “Looter.” In turn, only a rare few player-
praised F2P game companies (e.g., Riot Games, the creators 
of League of Legends) would consist of the kind of heroic 
figures that Rand calls “Movers” in her book Atlas Shrugged 
(1957).4 In this article, we use those terms to describe the 
ethical status of different monetization options.
In the following sections, we examine F2P business 
logic typologies from the perspective of rational ego-
ism. We contribute to wider discussion on business eth-
ics by means of F2P games as an example of how ration-
ally applied selfishness can be perceived as virtuous. The 
article first discusses the principles of Rand’s philosophy, 
Objectivism. Then, it presents previously identified vide-
ogame monetization types from the perspectives of what 
we consider Mover and Looter revenue models. Following 
that, it examines an illustrative example case, Zynga, which 
has at different times exemplified both exploitation and 
Objectivist virtues. In the Discussion section, the article 
looks more thoroughly at the challenges of ethical moneti-
zation, and then concludes with a summary and remarks 
on the implications that its findings have for the business 
ethics of game design.
2 For the sake of readability, we use the words “developer” and 
“designer” here to denote people involved in the creation and updat-
ing of a game, and do not elaborate upon all the different roles that 
game development teams actually contain (O’Donnell 2014, for 
details). Likewise, the publisher of a game can be different from the 
developers of that game, and make monetization decisions of their 
own, demanding changes from the developers.
3 When we speak of something in this article as ethical or unethical, 
or as virtuous or nonvirtuous, we will be using those terms always 
in the context of Objectivist ethics unless otherwise explicitly noted. 
4 Many concepts in this article, including the categories of Movers 
and Looters, are drawn from Rand’s fiction. Rand herself noted in her 
preface to For the New Intellectual (1961) that some key parts of her 
philosophy were expressed in her novels, in places like the speech 
of John Galt in Atlas Shrugged (1957). We have therefore chosen to 
include references to Rand’s fiction as well, in cases where that con-
tributes to the argument at hand.
This the same approach that Heimo et al. (2018) used in discussing 
the concepts in the context of Aristotle.
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Rand’s Objectivism and Ethics
Ayn Rand’s Objectivism is not the same philosophical view 
as the more commonly known objectivist school of philoso-
phy or the objectivity of science (e.g., Popper 1972). For 
Rand, people are objective when they act based on reality 
and rationally pursue their own selfish goals, trying their 
best to excel. In Objectivism evasion—the deliberate refusal 
to acknowledge reality—is a mortal sin (Smith 2006, p. 63). 
Rand’s philosophy, which is far too complex to properly 
summarize in a single article, is a system of virtue ethics 
(e.g., Peikoff 1991; Gotthelf and Salmieri 2016). Some of 
her virtues are quite different from those of, say, Aristo-
tle, who was nevertheless a significant influence on Rand’s 
work. For example, Objectivism sees all altruism as involv-
ing self-sacrifice, and thus as unethical. Acting against one’s 
own interest by giving up values does not promote one’s 
chances of survival and prosperity, and survival is the reason 
for which ethics exist, and why they are important to follow 
(Rand 1964).
For Objectivism (e.g., Rand 1964, pp. X–Xi; see also 
Peikoff 1991),5 virtuous selfishness is a question of rational 
self-interest. It requires one’s awareness of both ethical prin-
ciples and that which would be rational for oneself. One 
has to acknowledge objective reality and to act based on 
that acknowledgement. In order to survive and to thrive, 
humans need value from things such as food and beneficial 
social relationships. That value, Rand (e.g., 1964) argues, is 
gained by means of reason to identify the necessary moral 
principles, including virtues. By acting virtuously, one gains 
value. Selfishness is ‘not a license “to do as [one] pleases”’ 
(Gotthelf 2016). Being virtuous is an issue of both action 
and nature. Like Aristotle (350 BCA; see also McPherson 
2013), Objectivism believes that only when one follows vir-
tues by nature, having internalized them, one is truly virtu-
ous (Rand 1957). Being virtuous is a choice made for life, 
not just for a singular situation, and following virtues makes 
one more likely to thrive and prosper.
To exercise their virtues and to innovate (e.g., Rand 
1964), humans need freedom, which enables reason to func-
tion and to seek new solutions. This requires the absence of 
all forms of coercion by force, and fraud, that can prevent 
free decision-making. For Rand (e.g., 1961) governmental 
regulations are also a type of force and thus, by default, 
harmful. Life should be managed through one’s own efforts 
and free trade with others, following the “Trader Principle,” 
in which the parties connected to a trade define the value 
of each exchange (Wright 2016). Value is traded for value, 
in mutual agreement, for mutual benefit (Woiceshyn 2012). 
The intentional delivery of a faulty product or service is a 
form of fraud, as is not paying an agreed-upon price. As 
Rand (1964, p. 60) states, “When a man trades with others, 
he is counting—explicitly or implicitly—on their rational-
ity, that is: on their ability to recognize the objective value 
of his work. (A trade based on any other premise is a con 
game or a fraud.)”
We believe that free-to-play games illustrate an interest-
ing borderline case for Objectivism; some forms of their 
monetization are based on delivering a less than optimal 
service, yet they are for the most part distributed freely. 
What is thus “fair” trade in their case is harder for the par-
ticipants to define, because value propositions in the poten-
tial trade are unclear or hard to assess. Can we, for exam-
ple, consider extremely popular games such as FarmVille 
(Zynga 2009) or Pokémon GO (Niantic 2016) to be “bad” 
designs, or frauds, if millions of people find them enjoyable? 
FarmVille and other social games featured many playability 
problems (Paavilainen et al. 2013; Paavilainen et al. 2015) 
and Pokémon GO had many functional problems related to 
GPS tracking, application crashing, and battery consumption 
(Paavilainen et al. 2017).
Monetization and Games
Digital games, especially F2P games, are particularly suit-
able cases for the application of business ethics that address 
monetization (Heimo et al. 2018). In order to generate rev-
enue, many designers are intentionally luring players to pay, 
bombarding them during play with commercial ads and pay-
ment options which hinder the play experience, in order to 
wear down resistance to buying (Paavilainen et al. 2013; 
Paavilainen et al. 2015; Nieborg 2017). Furthermore, they 
may be making unethical decisions by employing the so-
called dark patterns (i.e., exploitative elements; see Zagal 
et al. 2013 for details) in game design. In other words, they 
are not making the “best game possible,” as far as service 
quality and play experiences are concerned (Heimo et al. 
2018). This does not mean that each designer should aim 
for a perfect Platonic ideal of a game, but rather that many 
designers are now intentionally including hindrances or 
psychological traps (Hamari 2011) in their games, at the 
expense of optimal gameplay, in order that players would 
be more likely to pay more.
From the player’s perspective, a designer’s self-interest 
(colloquially called erroneously, of course, “greed”) is sup-
posedly never good—at least not if one looks at bitter player 
commentaries on discussion fora. From an Objectivist per-
spective, designer self-interest is a good thing. A game that 
5 For the sake of readability, this article refers to Rand’s non-fiction 
essays as parts of the books in which they were published, instead of 
using each original year from e.g., the Objectivist Newsletter. Given 
that there is not much theoretical development between them, and 
because they were mostly written within the span of a handful of 
years, we do not differentiate each essay here.
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sells well is probably a good product and provides mutual 
value. It is quite unlikely (though not impossible) that mas-
sive sales could be accomplished by customers’ unawareness 
of what exactly is a quality product. A high-selling game, no 
matter how well it was made, fulfills some customer need or 
desire. This is especially true, if a game’s popularity persists 
beyond the initial rush that can sometimes be created purely 
with hype.
Many types of monetary transactions exist within digital 
games (Harviainen et al. 2018; Lehdonvirta and Castronova 
2014). For F2P games, relevant terms include monetization 
(producers earning money one way or another through the 
game), real-money transaction (RMT, the use of real-world 
money to buy something—typically premium in-game cur-
rency), and in-app purchase (IAP, the use of in-game pre-
mium currency to buy something of value within the game).6 
Players may additionally engage in trading of many kinds, 
and player-to-player markets usually evolve in multiplayer 
digital games. This happens even in cases where such mar-
kets are officially prohibited by the publishers of the games 
(Lehdonvirta and Castronova 2014). In this article, we nev-
ertheless focus on value issues relating to monetization, 
RMTs and IAPs, and not on player-to-player trading.
From the perspective of game design ethics (Sicart 2009, 
pp. 127–142), it can be argued that all elements connected 
to the play within the game’s information system can be seen 
as part of that system, including virtues and values. RMT is 
therefore a part of the game, and players accept that when 
they choose to play that specific game, even if they never 
spend money on it. RMT may not be a factor that they like 
(e.g., in cases of pay-to-win mechanics), but they neverthe-
less accept its presence.
This is where Objectivist ideals become applicable: if 
we agree that F2P games are meant to make money for their 
developers and publishers, the key question is whether the 
designers are creators who provide something significant. 
They may, instead, be people who profiteer by means of 
psychological traps to lure players to pay, people who just 
create inferior copies of others’ works, or people who ask 
for money or attention through appeals to emotion and 
downright begging. These can vary from game to game, 
and unethical business practices may also take place out-
side of play. For example, if the publisher of a Facebook 
game attempts to influence the content policies of Facebook 
itself, it would probably be considered an unethical market 
strategy.
In this article, we slightly deviate from Objectivism’s 
original viewpoint in that we believe that exploitation, 
in the form of luring people to pay, may also constitute 
unethical behavior. Rand (1957, 1964) states that coercion 
is only based on physical threats, however, we here take 
the approach that the use of methods which take advantage 
of peoples’ inherent weaknesses in decision-making also 
constitutes a type of fraud. This is especially pertinent in 
relation to the inability to abandon sunk costs and leave a 
problematic activity (Kahneman and Tversky 1974; Thaler 
and Sunstein 2009), as such techniques remove rationality 
from decision-making.
Heimo et al. (2018) divide game monetization options 
into three broad categories: traditional, pay-while-playing, 
and content and access. These further divide into smaller 
categories, discussed below alongside their ethical chal-
lenges. Other typologies exist (e.g., Hamari and Järvinen 
2011; Lehdonvirta and Castronova 2014), but we believe 
that this system best exemplifies the nuances of Objectiv-
ist viewpoints. It enables the examination of e.g., digital 
versions of planned obsolescence, the sales of incomplete 
products as “ready” (as opposed to the ethical use of early 
versions in market testing), and so forth, all of which by 
Objectivist standards are unethical practices (e.g., Rand 
1963).
Before we further discuss monetization, it must be noted 
that the F2P games market is already saturated with what 
Objectivism would consider “Second-Hander” games. Most 
of them are unoriginal copies of well-known works, and 
are typically advertised on social media (Van Roessel and 
Katzenbach 2018). From an Objectivist perspective, those 
copy-games fit the definition of passing something com-
monplace and derivative as radical and new, and are thus 
unethical. Given their copycat nature, this article will not 
examine those games at any length, and will instead turn 
to the monetization strategies that their developers likewise 
copied from the designers of the original games. For the sake 
of consistency and convenience, we will talk of Mover and 
Looter revenues, but as our case example later shows, some 
developers may also exhibit unethical practices other than 
Looting, including Second-Hander copying.
Mover Revenues
Movers are people who exemplify Objectivism’s virtues: 
rational self-interest, human prosperity as the standard of 
value, productiveness, honesty, pride in one’s own accom-
plishments, independence, integrity, and justice. Justice 
includes the Trader Principle of conducting just and fair 
business on a free market. Rand acknowledged the existence 
of many paths to that goal. The business plans and revenue 
models of her fictional protagonists are very different from 
one another, yet all of them are considered virtuous by Rand 
(e.g., Rand 1943, 1957). Many types of ethically sound game 
monetization types also exist.
6 IAP can also in some cases take place in direct transactions of 
RMT–IAP, without conversion to in-game premium currency.
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The most ethical game revenue models are, for Objectiv-
ism, in the same categories that Heimo et al. (2018) identi-
fied as the most virtuous in the Aristotelian sense. Their 
monetization methods come from the “Traditional” category, 
especially its sub-categories “Pay once,” “Pay periodically,” 
“Freeware,” “Shareware,” and the further divisible and more 
ambiguous “Lure-to-p(l)ay.” Excluding “Freeware,” these 
are all categories in which a complete or regularly updated 
game is provided in exchange for money.
In “Pay once,” the players pay for the full game. It can 
be purchased from either a physical store or an online mar-
ketplace such as Steam. At a quick glance, this would seem 
the perfect Objectivist option: a complete play environment, 
sold as one item, and allowing players to master it accord-
ing to their skills. Nevertheless, a problem exists: whereas 
an indestructible frying pan (Rand 1957) would preserve its 
value forever, interesting game content may run out. This is 
especially likely in games of progression, games which move 
towards completion (or at least advancement) through play 
(Alha et al. 2018). A “perfect” progression game can still be 
Objectivistically viewed the same way as a well-made good: 
it is something that fulfills all needs related to its area of use 
for a long time, and thus frees an individual’s purchasing 
power to be applied elsewhere. Yet its value-in-use probably 
decreases over time. Since such a game can be compared to 
things such as consumer goods or good movies there is no 
real ethical problem. Many F2Ps nevertheless try solving 
the value-decrease problem through rules and designs that 
foster interaction. In such games of emergence, other players 
create increased, often unpredictable interaction that works 
as a guarantee of further content (Juul 2002), which emerges 
from the infinitely varied activities between players (e.g., 
attacks by other players in Clash of Clans).
A well-supported “Pay periodically” game fulfills Objec-
tivism’s expectations almost perfectly. A company providing 
masterful new content in a timely fashion at an optimal price 
(typically a monthly fee) allows the player to make purchas-
ing decisions on a regular basis, to evaluate the product con-
tinuously, and to even influence the game design in some 
cases (Czarnota 2016; Lehtonen and Harviainen 2016). 
Compared to the “Pay once” model, games for which people 
periodically pay tend to keep their value due to updates. The 
ethical problem with this model is that it plays on loss aver-
sion and sunk costs, since the players are essentially paying 
(in time and/or money) for continued access to the results 
of their own efforts (Hamari 2011). If they stop playing the 
game and stop paying for it, their earlier activities within that 
game are rendered without direct value to them. Periodically 
paying play behavior can also lead to clinical problems such 
as an internet gaming disorder (King and Delfabbo 2014).
“Freeware” is a more challenging model. In it, the devel-
oper freely distributes a game due to some goal. It therefore 
represents the very altruism and free distribution that were 
anathema to Rand (e.g., 1964). If, however, the designer 
is distributing the game out of rationally egoistic pleasure-
giving reasons, such as one’s own sense of pride in a good 
product or a desire for self-expression (Smith 2006), no ethi-
cal problem exists. Likewise, if the game is given freely as 
an investment for future gain (e.g., as a demonstration of 
one’s skill before making another, monetizable game, or as 
a work sample for potential employers to see), no ethical 
conflict exists with one’s intent for personal prosperity.
Freeware in many ways exemplifies the challenge of F2P 
monetization to Objectivism, while also embodying Objec-
tivism’s virtues: freeware (and F2P in general) are excellent 
marketing methods. At the same time, however, whenever 
people get something for free, even just a part, they become 
more reluctant to pay and more eager to get even more parts 
for free. Whether this is seen as “entertainment socialism,” 
in which a monetizable minority pays for the play of the 
rest, or as just market forces of demand in action, depends 
on the interpreter in question. “Shareware” tries solving this 
conundrum with the idea that only a selected part (the first 
levels of a game; a limited set of weapons) is free. The player 
has the option of buying the rest of the content, usually as 
a single purchase (Heimo et al. 2018), turning the situation 
then to “Pay once.” This can be very honest marketing, when 
done correctly, and is then perfectly aligned with Objectiv-
ism’s ideals of fair trading. “Lure-to-p(l)ay” uses a similar 
approach, offering content for free until a certain point, at 
which sunk cost fallacies and other psychological tricks are 
deployed, so that the player wants to spend money in order to 
keep playing (Hamari 2011). The difference between Share-
ware and Lure-to-p(l)ay is that in Shareware, the amount of 
content available for free is explicitly stated before play-
ing. In Lure-to-p(l)ay, the player will encounter sometimes 
quite surprising points at which the designers are trying to 
get them to pay for more. If this is done in a dishonest or 
exploitative way, the model becomes the unethical “Lure-to-
pay” (see below) instead. In the best cases, it is an extremely 
efficient combination for ethical monetization, one that the 
players will appreciate, and in which they want to pay in 
order to not just get more content, but to also reward the 
designers for a job well done, in order to inspire them to 
provide even more value (Alha et al. 2018; Harviainen et al. 
2018).
From the perspective of the designers and publishers, the 
important issue is whether a player can be incited to make 
their first in-app or content purchase. Only 5% of players 
are willing to pay real money, e.g., in-app purchases (Leh-
donvirta and Castronova 2014). Even a single, initial RMT 
purchase significantly lowers the threshold of spending 
again, as long as the game remains at least as good as it 
was before (Luton 2013). From an Objectivist point of view, 
selling good content is clearly virtuous. The situation is ethi-
cally clearer in the case of downloadable content (e.g., new 
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expansions to a previously purchased game) than it is in the 
case of micro-transactional F2P in-app purchases, the value 
of which is harder to evaluate beforehand.
A central point of ethics for in-game purchases is that of 
what exactly is bought with the real money. For example, 
on markets for virtual goods (e.g., Hamari and Lehdonvirta 
2010; Lehdonvirta and Castronova 2014) far superior ammu-
nition may make a combat game too imbalanced (Heimo 
et al. 2018), as is discussed below. That, in turn, may lead 
the developers into creating increasingly less skill-based 
gameplay in order to sell more virtual goods to players look-
ing for competitive advantages (Paul, 2018). Likewise, the 
heavily debated “loot box” or “gacha” mechanics, in which 
players pay real-world money to get to open randomized 
packages of additional content, are like gambling systems 
in which players do not know how much they will need to 
pay for the complete product after having already made an 
initial purchase. Suspicions also exist that the companies 
in charge of such games may alter the content of purchased 
boxes before they are opened. (Koeder et al. 2018.)
On the other hand, the sales of purely cosmetic elements 
and nothing else in games like DOTA2 (Valve Corporation 
2013) are completely in accordance with Objectivism. Such 
virtual items are fair trading par excellence.7 Looter rev-
enues, discussed next, are the opposite.
Looter Revenues
Looting is the use of unethical tools such as force, theft, 
fraud, cronyism, and/or appeals to gain access to others’ 
belongings. First of the potential Looter8 models is “Lure-
to-pay.” It is the most ethically complex of all monetization 
types, because all F2P games that include real-money trad-
ing are essentially Lure-to-p(l)ay or Lure-to-pay in some 
way (Heimo et al. 2018). In F2P research, “luring” refers to 
the ways in which some games are designed to entice peo-
ple to keep playing and to commit more, and to eventually 
start paying when they feel they have committed too much 
to quit (Kimppa et al. 2015). As noted in the case of the 
closely related Lure-to-p(l)ay, luring means enough content 
is made available without pay, for the purposes of getting 
players to pay later.
Therefore, in Looter luring, progress is repeatedly hin-
dered by artificial constraints, tailored frustration points, and 
unnecessary waiting (the “Pay-to-pass-boring” approach; 
see also offline progress mechanics from Paavilainen et al. 
2013). This is where the “inferior product” issue appears, 
alongside factors such as the sunk cost fallacy (a type of 
loss aversion in which already paid costs are seen as lost 
if one does not receive the expected benefits; Arkes and 
Blumer 1985; Hamari 2011) and other psychological traps. 
Rand (1957) firmly opposed making money “by pandering 
to men’s vices or to men’s stupidity.” Using methods such 
as taking advantage of the human decision-making flaws, 
discovered by psychologists and behavioral economists (e.g., 
Kahneman and Tversky 1974; Thaler and Sunstein 2009), in 
order to get players addicted and to deceive them regarding 
content value is clearly unethical.9 In Lure-to-pay, designers 
explicitly and intentionally play (and prey) on human weak-
nesses, and turn what may look to an outsider like a case 
of free decision-making into exploitation. A person whose 
free decision-making is hampered by intentionally designer-
fostered addiction or purposefully inflated loss aversion is 
no longer capable of exercising full volition. We, like Alha 
et al. (2018), consider such situations to be a type of fraud, 
especially when luring is utilized in a context where the 
developers provide insufficient or incorrect information on 
the potential value of a purchase (Švelch 2017).
A company in charge of a game may, furthermore, alter 
the rules (e.g., its End-User License Agreements, EULAs) 
at any time, on a one-sided basis, once players have been 
lured to commit to playing (Heimo et al. 2018). In our view, 
this is against Objectivism’s concepts of fair trade. It may 
be argued that if customers do not read each new EULA 
version, it is their own fault, but with such documents often 
being both massive and frequently updated, we believe that 
such radical changes approach Objectivism’s views on scam-
ming, rather than any concept of fair trade.
The second problematic model is “pay-to-win,” an 
extreme sub-type of “pay-while-playing.” In it, players are 
given access to advantages, such as superior ammunition 
in World of Tanks (Wargaming 2010), through real-money 
transactions. In Objectivist terms, this limits nonpaying 
individuals’ use of skill—but only if we consider the game 
on its own, as a closed system (Sicart 2009). If, however, 
8 In most of Rand’s text (e.g., 1957) “Looter” points to especially 
those who use force either directly or indirectly to get more than their 
fair share of trade. We include here the use of fraud and dirty tricks 
into that concept, for the sake of readability, instead of creating a 
larger typology.
9 In terms of behavioral economics, Objectivism could be said to 
expect that people can and should evolve into the rational Econs of 
economic theory, from the flawed and inconsistent Humans that 
humans by nature are (e.g., Thaler and Sunstein 2009). Objectiv-
ism would also strongly object to the kind of paternalism inherent in 
many applications of behavioral economics by governments and other 
organizations (e.g., Kapeliushnikov 2015).
7 It needs to be noted that players sometimes nevertheless turn these 
mechanics, too, into forms of gambling or exploitation between play-
ers. Some players furthermore make a living by converting such “use-
less” virtual cosmetic items, which they acquire as gifts through e.g., 
streaming their play online, back into real money.
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pay-to-win is seen as a part of the wider world and not 
just of the game-system, Objectivism would accept peo-
ple using their wealth in the ways that they desire (Rand 
1957). This brings us to ethically interesting territory: to 
what extent should we expect play to be separate from 
the surrounding reality? A traditional viewpoint would 
argue “completely” (Huizinga 1955; Salen and Zimmer-
mann 2004). Gambling ethics studies (e.g., Cheng et al. 
2017), in turn, would say that the two are closely tied, 
through clear and causally observable consequences. The 
Objectivist approach would be to say that since real-money 
transactions and in-app purchases are part of the game’s 
concept, gameplay can and should also be influenced by 
the financial success of players outside the arena of play, 
the same as any other activity. (It should not, however, 
be influenced by e.g., user interfaces that lure children to 
use RMT without parental knowledge, which are clearly 
unethical in also Objectivist terms.) As Alha et al. (2018) 
note, animosity between players who engage in RMT and 
those who do not is quite common, reflecting the differ-
ence between those who emphasize skill and those who 
emphasize the ability to pay.
A clear-cut case can be found in the false advertising of 
games, which is simply fraud. Sometimes, however, devel-
opers honestly aim to create the best game possible, yet 
they fail to deliver (Kimppa et al. 2015; O’Donnell 2014). 
Initial trailers, crowdfunding campaign materials, and even 
pre-release versions may look great, but the final product 
can still be subpar. By that time, however, people will have 
invested their money into the failed project. They receive 
something, but not that which was supposed to be delivered. 
On the one hand, this is fair trade and risk-taking, appreci-
ated by Rand (e.g., 1961, 1967). On the other hand, Objec-
tivism condemns foolish risk-taking at the expense of others 
(Rand 1957). So while in Objectivist terms we can say that 
to take risks at the market is virtuous, the system should 
be set so that in the case of failure, debtors can attempt to 
reclaim their investments. In cases such as crowdfunded 
games, the backers are not risk-taking venture investors, but 
people who have made a pre-purchase on a promised deliv-
ery quality. They are customers expecting a fair trade.
What makes all these models ethically problematic is the 
aforementioned “inferior product” issue (Table 1 for a sum-
mary with some examples of exceptions). While the three 
first types in Column B of the table are not unethical by 
Objectivist standards per se, we argue here that they are too 
often in especially F2P games based on Rand’s (1957) “pan-
dering to stupidity.” This is why we say “predominantly”—
the same systems can be applied both ethically and not, 
depending on the manner of implementation, context, and 
the anticipation of social pressure. If it is open and fair trade, 
there is no ethical problem. If there is exploitation based on 
hidden information, a problem exists. In our view, the first 
three in Column B are also likely to contain elements that 
amount to fraud, due to the psychological traps applied in 
their design in order to make paying more likely. They can 
be applied in a virtuous manner, but they rarely are.
In Objectivist fair trade, everything is fine as long as the 
market is able to set the price. This creates two challenges. 
The first one is that within any game that is not sold as “Pay 
once,” the developers can guide the in-game market as they 
see fit, with the players having only the options of either 
agreeing, or leaving the game and all their sunk costs and 
achievements within it behind (Lehdonvirta and Castronova 
2014). This can be a very powerful market force, in situa-
tions where a game constitutes a record of past investments, 
potential new play affordances, and even one’s primary link 
to one’s social circles. Players have, as a result of this pres-
sure, been observed as being extremely reluctant to change 
the games which they play (ibid.). A handful of rare but 
important exceptions exist, like EVE Online, in which some 
player groups are practically unionized and can exert signifi-
cant market pressure (Czarnota 2016).
The second challenge is that many F2P games combine 
together marketing hype, psychological traps, player com-
modification, and sunk-cost fallacies. It is thus not always at 
all clear where the line of fair trade lies in cases of intention-
ally “bad” F2P designs. Some of those are in fact tools made 
to lure people to play them, others are just flawed attempts at 
producing something engaging and enticing. The price–qual-
ity range of such games is very difficult to assess at the time 
of the first few purchases (or when dealing with derivative, 
Table 1  A rough outline of monetization types by category
A: Predominantly mover B: Predominantly looter
Pay once (if product is good enough) Lure-to-pay by means of tricks that limit players’ rational decision-making, or deception
Pay periodically Pay for virtual goods (if to win or for imbalanced loot box options), when not made explicit to the players
Freeware Pay-to-pass-boring
Shareware False advertising
Lure-to-p(l)ay Player commodification and not-agreed-upon data sales to third parties (including EULA manipulation)
Pay for virtual goods (if for more 
content or extra aesthetics)
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copycat Second-Hander games). Due to such uncertainties, 
people are likely to make deals they will later regret (Bell 
1982). This is very different from knowing that an Opel will 
cost less than an Audi and thus it will also feature fewer 
luxury perks.
Free-to-play games are monetization tools that rely on 
providing the feel of a great play experience while ensuring 
the players have enough problems in progressing, in order 
that those players will spend money and not just time and 
effort to bypass the problems (Harviainen et al. 2018). Only 
a very rare few games are able to elicit enough revenue with 
players just “rewarding” the designers with money because 
they like the game (instead of e.g., paying for a play advan-
tage or the removal of an obstacle). Likewise, very few 
games can focus solely on monetizing via cosmetic items 
that do not affect gameplay (Heimo et al. 2018). Instead, the 
games have to use abovementioned systems to create situ-
ations where the players will feel a desire or even a need to 
play. Thus, they function on the borderline of Lure-to-p(l)
ay, and Lure-to- pay. We will next discuss the implications 
this has for the customers themselves, using an illustrative 
example case.
Case Example: Zynga
Here, we look at a key case example from the F2P social 
network games industry. Zynga is an American video game 
developer and publisher company that was founded in 2007 
and became (in)famous during the golden era of Facebook 
gaming between 2008 and 2012 (Mäyrä et al. 2017). Zynga’s 
Mafia Wars (2008), FarmVille (2009), FrontierVille (2010), 
CityVille (2010), and other social games featured tens of 
millions of players, and the company was considered the 
market leader in the social games industry (Caioli 2010). 
In the following section, we examine Zynga’s game designs 
through the Objectivist lens. As the company itself has 
so far seen very little academic analysis, we utilize media 
sources for our illustration. Our analysis reveals that Zynga 
has portrayed many activities Objectivism considers virtu-
ous or nonvirtuous during its heyday as the top developer of 
social games. Zynga has played different roles, from Second-
Hander to Looter, and ultimately a Mover as well.
Zynga has portrayed Second-Hander practices since the 
very beginning of Facebook games by developing games 
such as Mafia Wars and FarmVille, which were considered 
to be blatant copies of Mob Wars (Maestri 2008) and Farm-
Town (Slashkey 2009), respectively (Fig. 1).10 Zynga ended 
up settling the issue between Mafia Wars and Mob Wars in 
the court, which apparently cost Zynga $7-$9 million USD 
(Arrington 2009a). Many other games from Zynga were con-
sidered copies as well. Some resulted in new legal battles 
with Electronic Arts, for example, due the similarities in The 
Ville (Zynga 2012) and The Sims Social (Electronic Arts 
2011) (Grubb 2013). As Zynga repeatedly copied competi-
tors’ games and made them popular through viral market-
ing and cross-promotions, this can be considered a prime 
example of Second-Handing, where the company does not 
create anything of its own, just copies the success of others.
Many examples also exist of how Zynga can be seen as 
a Looter. It has utilized almost every tool from the above-
mentioned game mechanics, psychology, and market-
ing to drive revenues up in questionable ways. This was 
openly admitted by their former CEO Mark Pincus, who 
Fig. 1  Visual similarities between FarmTown (left) and Zynga’s FarmVille (right)
10 Image retrieved under CreativeCommons from https ://kenmi njia.
wordp ress.com/2012/01/27/why-zynga -sucks /.
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stated “I did every horrible thing in the book to, just to 
get revenues right away” (Arrington 2009b). For exam-
ple, the progression in FarmVille was hindered, in order 
to force players to either pay real money or to invite more 
friends to play. Otherwise, the players could not expand 
their farms (Paavilainen et al. 2013). Pay-to-pass-boring 
was a common hindrance in many Zynga’s games: actions 
required certain amount of time to be completed, but the 
player could pay real money to speed (or skip) the pro-
cess. This appointment mechanic also punished players if 
they did not tend their farms in time, as the planted crops 
would wither away. Withered crops could, however, be 
rejuvenated later with RMT, if the player paid the price. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, the line of fair trade is 
hard to define here. The rules of the game were not hid-
den from the players, and all these mechanics were clearly 
stated. There was, however, one case of clear Looting: lead 
generation offer scams. Let us see the Pincus quote in full 
(one expletive removed):
I knew that i wanted to control my destiny, so I knew 
I needed revenues, right, […], now. Like I needed rev-
enues now. So I funded the company myself but I did 
every horrible thing in the book to, just to get revenues 
right away. I mean we gave our users poker chips if 
they downloaded this zwinky toolbar which was like, 
I dont know, I downloaded it once and couldn’t get rid 
of it. *laughs* We did anything possible just to just get 
revenues so that we could grow and be a real business 
(Mark Pincus, in Arrington 2009b)
Lead generation offers (Carlson 2009) were a mechanism 
for players to gain premium currency by purchasing third-
party software, or by installing tool bars like the one Pincus 
mentioned above (Mäyrä et al. 2017). These were generally 
considered scams, as players either paid excessive amount of 
money in relation to the in-game benefits which they gained, 
or, for example, they ended up with expensive mobile SMS 
subscription deals. Even if utilizing game mechanics in vari-
ous ways to lure players to pay is not considered Looting, 
lead generation scamming schemes would most definitely 
fit that category.
The monetization (and Second-Hander copying) charac-
teristics here are clearly similar to the Money-Appropria-
tion (a type of Looting) explained by Rand: “The Money-
Appropriator is essentially non-creative. His basic goal is to 
acquire an unearned share of the wealth created by others. 
He seeks to get rich, not by conquering nature, but by manip-
ulating men, not by intellectual effort, but by social maneu-
vering. He does not produce, he redistributes.” (Rand 1963, 
p. 68). In addition to aforementioned Looter methods, Zynga 
also made an exclusive deal with Facebook (Cifaldi 2012), 
one that was later overturned (Ha 2012). The details of this 
deal were not disclosed in public, but it can be speculated 
that the deal gave Zynga some sort of exclusivity or upper 
hand against its competitors on Facebook at the time.
Despite Zynga having demonstrated Second-Hander and 
Looter roles in its practices, it can also be seen as a Mover. 
Tens of millions of players have enjoyed various games by 
Zynga, and the company was an icon of social games design. 
When Zynga copied from others, it often next improved the 
copied design). It also produced interesting original game 
content that pushed social games forward, with games like 
FrontierVille (Zynga 2010), Indiana Jones Adventure World 
(Zynga 2011), and Empires and Allies (Zynga 2011). Zynga 
can be also seen as a role model on how to approach the 
games-as-services paradigm (Hamari and Järvinen 2011), 
with seasonal updates and pacing the play patterns with 
weekly rhythms (Tyni et al. 2011). Zynga was also a strong 
proponent of using game analytics for metrics-driven design, 
a practice that has now become an industry standard. Such 
design can be perceived as an attempt at better giving the 
playing audiences what they want—or to exploit them more 
precisely (Murphy 2014).
The case example with Zynga shows that the F2P game 
developers can wear many hats at the same time (or at 
least consecutively), and sometimes it is difficult to draw 
a clear line between ethical and nonethical designs, except 
in retrospect. Zynga has obtained parts of its market posi-
tion through unethical means, but also shown integrity and 
innovation in the field at other times, and definitely pro-
vided also positive experiences for its customers. Excluding 
the clear cases of exploitation stated by Pincus, many of 
the other unethical decisions can be explained by the facts 
that in real life, consistent virtuous behavior is rare. People 
default to pragmatism, when they are not aware of moral 
codes or when they do not want to use them, and it is dif-
ficult to know all of the facts upon which a rational egoist 
decision could be made. Some individuals also strive harder 
for ethical behavior than others do. It is not at all unreason-
able to presume that some people inside our case company 
were also seeking to do the best they could. They may have 
been Mover personalities themselves, just ones with limited 
power to affect the works which they were producing.
Zynga, in the most literal sense, moved the social games 
industry in many ways, and gave a face to both good and bad 
social games design. In the long run, its prosperity appears 
to have come from eventually embracing rational profit-
seeking instead of greed and exploitation. So while we do 
not know the ethics of its staff and managers, the company 
stands as a useful model for why a rational egoist approach 
to business will produce better results in the long run than 
any greedy short-term approach can. When people thought 
Zynga’s practices unethical and exploitative, they stopped 
playing, but once the company remedied its course, it has 
been able to maintain a steady player presence and thereby 
also a steady source of revenue.
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What about the Players?
The most interesting challenge to Objectivist F2P ethics 
comes not from these monetization options, but from the 
fact that F2P games can also mislead players as to how their 
personal data is used. This process has been called “player 
commodification” in earlier research (Nieborg 2015; based 
on Mosco 2009). The data of (and on) players, like that of 
the users of “free” social media such as Facebook, are some-
times the products that are being sold to third parties, rang-
ing from advertisers to political interest groups. The use of 
the “free” software is thus not actually free to the user, but is 
monetized by making use of player data (Zhu 2016). Objec-
tivism believes in a free market (e.g., Rand 1964; Brook and 
Watkins 2012). To lure players with promises of play, and to 
lure the largest amount of money out of them through covert 
means instead of subscriptions and other types of fair trade, 
is a Looter strategy. Rand believed firmly on fair pay for fair 
work, and that the market would find an equilibrium for fair 
payment between employers and workers (e.g., 1957; 1964). 
Player commodification, in the form of “you will get to play 
this for free (and while we will not say it, we will sell your 
data to outsiders),” is not fair trade.
This carries over to how we should view player com-
modification from an Objectivist perspective: player com-
modification too is essentially the luring players to use an 
inferior product, and thus not fair trade in which actual 
value can be perceived by all parties. Were the designers 
only doing it openly for e.g., price discrimination (“you can 
also get it for free, but we then have access to your per-
sonal data”), this might be ethical. Since, however, access to 
data by third parties is normally a (well hidden) part of the 
End-User License Agreement and thus something required 
from everyone wanting to play, it is not. Even within Sicart’s 
(2009) rather lenient system ethics viewpoint, there are sys-
tem-external interests involved. As designers furthermore 
use play-hindrance based incentives to get users to virally 
advertise the game (a type of Pay-to-pass-boring, in which 
instead of paying money one needs to invite more people to 
play the game, or share an advertisement, in order to pro-
gress; Paavilainen et al. 2013; Nieborg 2015), we are on 
dubious ground with even the most selfishness-friendly ethi-
cal systems. The players have the option to stop playing, of 
course, but hiding these options deep in an EULA, while 
eliciting more players to join by a combination of simplistic, 
immediate calls to action by the company and simultane-
ous social pressure by friends, is not ethical. It may not be 
coercion at gunpoint, but it is unethical nevertheless, using 
dirty tricks of many kinds at once in a combination that 
amounts to scamming. Better options are needed, should 
the designers wish to be virtuous, and to last in the business 
for the long haul.
A F2P game has to be well enough done to retain players. 
Most of them will never pay anything. As playing time, and 
thus player retention, has been observed to be a key factor 
on spending real money on the game, it is in the interests of 
the designer to create a well-done game to play (Alha et al. 
2014; Fields and Cotton 2012; Hamari et al. 2017a, b; Alha 
et al. 2018; Lin and Sun 2011; Seufert 2014). At the same 
time, play has to contain enough incentives for players to 
want to pay while playing, or to reward the designers and 
publishers for a job well done (Fig. 2). The former is easier 
to accomplish, yet the latter is much closer to both Objectiv-
ist ideals and the goal of value co-creation between provid-
ers and customers. In many cases, a game would optimally 
combine both, and make players feel like they are rewarding 
great design by buying something more for their gameplay 
as well. While Objectivism would accept many forms of 
incentivization, as long as they are based on Mover logics 
and not Looting or copying, Rand (1961) makes it very clear 
throughout her work that the truly virtuous person is the one 
who does not need to use any sort of manipulation. A well 
Fig. 2  The multiplayer online battle arena game DOTA2 (Valve 2013), where the players can purchase cosmetic items that do not have a func-
tional purpose in the game, for real money. (Picture by J. Rissanen)
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done game design, marketed skillfully, should be able to 
accomplish this.
Discussion
The business ethical argument here comes down to the fact 
that for Objectivism, rational egoism may never be preda-
tory. Acting unethically is acting against one’s own interests. 
Value propositions should be made clear and transparent for 
all parties, because that facilitates clear trade. If exploitative 
techniques are deployed, long-term success of the developers 
becomes unlikely, perhaps impossible. Virtuous action does 
not guarantee business success, but it is a necessary pre-req-
uisite without which true success is impossible (Smith 1998, 
p. 72). Objectivism believes that predatory behavior will not 
serve a person’s rational interests in the long run (Peikoff 
1991; Smith 2006; Swanton 2014; Woiceshyn 2012).
As formulated by Smith (2014, p. 145; emphases in 
the original): “Virtues are virtues, in Rand’s view, on the 
grounds that their exercise is necessary in order for the 
results of one’s actions to be genuinely valuable.” One has 
to produce a game that answers players’ desires and needs, 
and market it fairly and honestly, in order to be virtuous. 
Using tools such as player commodification to make money 
out of something supposedly free, for example, is not virtu-
ous, nor is the use of psychological traps. We believe that 
while being unethical may have provided Zynga an early 
temporary advantage, in the end their ethical, rational ego-
ism, manifested in well-done design and fair trade, was what 
enabled the once thoroughly hated company to survive and 
prosper again.
The primary challenge that would remain in cases such as 
Zynga’s, therefore, is Rand’s true conundrum: she notes that 
most people are not rational and virtuous. So why should any 
Mover expect to be able to conduct fair, trustworthy trade 
with them? In F2P games, accomplishing this seems to be 
possible, however. If the design is both virtuous and suffi-
ciently adaptable, the Mover stays in charge, yet the design 
still provides clear value for the players. It does not matter 
if the customers’ integrity is not as strong. The design is a 
good, virtuous design.
As this article has argued, virtuous design is not a clear-
cut issue, as far as monetization techniques are concerned. 
On the contrary, it is a question of how certain methods 
and psychological tools are applied. For example, introduc-
ing drastic pay-to-win mechanics into a game that people 
are already playing is a Looter move that potentially ruins 
user value for many of the players. In some other games, 
such as the digital cards based Hearthstone and Magic: The 
Gathering Arena, players nevertheless seem to accept pay-
to-win mechanics as a normal part of the game. From the 
Objectivist perspective, the defining line is therefore whether 
the developers are using coercion, fraud, the obfuscation of 
facts, or psychological traps to an extent at which players’ 
rational decision-making is severely hindered.
While we have in this study focused on the ethics of game 
developers, we believe that the key concepts of this article 
have also wider implications. Game monetization is con-
stantly being debated by developers and players alike (e.g., 
Alha et al. 2018). What the players first and foremost appear 
to require in games is transparency, so that they will know 
that they are making a fair trade when they sign up or spend 
real money (Švelch 2017). When they have to fear hidden 
agendas in each EULA change, the sudden alteration of 
game mechanics heavily towards pay-to-win, or other forms 
of developer decision, they will become more likely to avoid 
spending their money, no matter how good a game is at a 
certain point in time. Rand’s virtues offer a clear course with 
which developers can avoid these problems, as Objectivism 
guides its adherents to at all times staying rational and fair.
This is also the article’s direct contribution to business 
ethics in general. Customers do not appreciate exploitative 
monetization, one-sided alterations to agreements, deception 
or obfuscation, or fraudulent promises of service. The exam-
ple of Zynga shows that even a large company can suffer 
from drastic customer attrition, if its business practices are 
seen as exploitative. We have studied Objectivist virtues here 
in the context of game monetization also because games, due 
to their voluntary nature and varying monetization systems, 
allow for a wide-scale examination of the variances of gain-
ing customer value for money. We believe that the same 
principles also apply to a great extent to other forms of busi-
ness, and see this work as a correlation with research that 
has earlier argued for taking Objectivist virtues to heart in 
order to profit and to stay profitable (Locke and Woiceshyn 
1995; Woiceshyn 2012).
The central limitation of this study is that few if any game 
designers, developers or publishers have come forth as fol-
lowers of Objectivism. Our analysis has therefore taken 
place on a theoretical level. Further studies are needed, in 
order to see if the theoretical advantages can be verified 
in action in game companies, the same way that certain 
authors state that those can be found in e.g., the banking 
sector (Allison 2013; Brook and Watkins 2012). What also 
requires further research is the influence of players, an aspect 
also important from the perspective of value co-creation in 
play. While the designers and publishers have dominance 
over their game as a system and thus also its monetization 
mechanics, the players form a market force of their own. The 
majority of online games have to rely on a sufficient number 
of players in order to create interesting, emergent play, so 
that their players do not get bored. On a practical level, if 
enough players start voting with their time, attention, and 
wallets, and choose to play something else instead, they turn 
into a force able to push the game (possibly also the game 
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company) out of existence. Zynga’s history, as presented in 
the media, seems to show this phenomenon quite well, and 
also the ways in which the company appears to have cor-
rected its course.
It is also necessary to study more closely which of the 
techniques of enticing players to pay are actually reliant on 
psychological traps that reduce or remove the possibility 
of rational decision-making. For example, some researchers 
(e.g., Lin and Sun 2011) have argued that the mechanic of 
first purchasing in-game premium currency with real-world 
money (RMT), and then purchasing game content or virtual 
goods with the premium in-game currency (IAP) clouds the 
price-value ratio of the eventual purchases for many players, 
making the trade unfair. Likewise, the use of loot boxes in 
games, and the addition to micro-transactions to games that 
were originally sold as purely pay once, raise questions that 
require much more research. In the former case, the system 
is extremely vulnerable to developer manipulation. In the 
latter, while it is a form of offering players more content or 
options, it can also be a type of exploitation that ruins the 
value of an already purchased game to many players, in the 
case of e.g., introducing a severe pay-to-win system. In such 
cases, many players will stop playing.
Conclusions
This article has discussed how some ways of game mon-
etization are more virtuous than others, by the standards 
of Ayn Rand’s philosophy of Objectivism. It has identified 
how certain designs—those that provide an enjoyable play 
experience, for which people willingly pay—as virtuous, 
and others as derivative and ethically problematic, and 
examined these through the example of a company, Zynga. 
Many of the activities Rand’s ethics would consider virtuous 
are those also identified by Heimo et al. (2018) as virtuous 
design by Aristotelian standards. Motives for virtuous action 
in business may thus be very different, but the actual results 
appear to be quite the same, as long as the designers seek a 
virtuous life. It results in a more enjoyable game experience 
for the players, i.e., more value for them, and a solid revenue 
stream for the developers providing an ethically monetized 
game, because only players who like a game will continue 
paying for it. We identified monetization models that sell a 
ready product at a fair price, and games that are open about 
what they offer for free and what requires RMT, as most 
likely to be virtuous designs. Likewise, games that prey on 
human weaknesses, offer inferior quality compared to what 
is being claimed, or covertly sell player data to other parties, 
are likely to be unethical. They will therefore eventually be 
harmful to their creators’ long-term interests.
On a theoretical level, this article has contributed to the 
understanding of how designer, development, and publisher 
integrity will contribute to a better market situation. When 
those in charge act with rational self-interest instead of 
exploitation, people are more likely to appreciate what they 
sell. A game that the designers themselves also enjoy and 
appreciate is likelier to make money. Customers pay will-
ingly, and they pay more. In return, they get fair value for 
what they pay. As game monetization is a form of trade, it 
should strive for fair trade in all situations. While it is cer-
tainly not easy to always accomplish Objectivist virtues and 
values, there are clear benefits for doing so, even in a not so 
Objectivist society. In order to expect fairness from others, 
one needs to start with oneself. And for that, rational egoism 
offers a clear, uncompromising guideline. It is in the interest 
of each developer to create good play, to trade fairly, and to 
treat their players as partners in value co-creation, not as 
sources of revenue ripe for exploitation through tricks like 
mental traps. In other words, designers, developers, and pub-
lishers will benefit from being the best Movers that they can 
be. Acquiring and following a strictly rational moral code 
will help them accomplish this goal.
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